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Abstract EU expert institutions delivering policy advice
about the promise of emerging technologies, help frame the
issues that technologies might address. Their assumptions
about European contexts for technology futures therefore
warrant critical attention. Drawing on current theoretical work
in science and technology studies, archival research and inter-
views with policy actors, this article examines the European
Commission’s recently established European Technology
Platforms. It focuses in particular on the industry stakeholder
group advising the Commission on carbon capture and stor-
age, a technology with implications for several industry and
policy sectors. The paper demonstrates how expert-produced
technology scenarios build on assumptions (1) about the pol-
ities the technology is thought to serve, and (2) the political
priorities that it might address. By showing how such assump-
tions affect on-going technology development efforts, the
paper suggests ways for sociotechnical dynamics to be better
appreciated within EU units for technology planning.
Keywords EU . Expert forums . Policy tools . Sociotechnical
imaginaries . Strategic reasoning .Wicked problems
Driven by a need for strategic reasoning, a diverse array of
new institutions designed to advise governments and
policymakers on emerging technologies have emerged in
recent years, drawing in part on concepts and methodologies
from Futures Studies (FS). A long, if fragmented, tradition of
examining the aims and means of prediction might enable
scholars in FS and related fields to offer input to practitioners
charged with delivering estimates and recommendations for
public policy—such as in the form of technology assessment
methodologies involving diverse groups of stakeholders and
experts [1]. Moreover, institutional developments that in cer-
tain ways operationalize FS approaches in a policy context,
might offer interesting objects of study in their own right.
Theoretical resources from science and technology studies
(STS) are relevant in this context. STS scholars tend to study
the societal and political dynamics around developments in
science and technology with a so-called symmetrical ap-
proach, where the development and circulation of technolo-
gies and truth claims in society are explained sociologically,
rather than as direct functions of their technological functions
or epistemic validity [2, 3]. This foundation has led STS
scholars to investigate topics related to social organization
and knowledge institutions, as well as the role of experts in
controversies related to science and technology. These topics
intersect with current FS conversations about stakeholder
participation in foresight, and the impacts of prediction for
societal institutions in the present [4–7]. Where units for
strategic reasoning are established to deliver policy advice
on emerging technologies addressing “wicked” environmen-
tal problems [8], STS-perspectives on expert predictions can
yield useful insights into how public interests and political
priorities are implicated in the process.
This article examines a new addition to the complex of
expert bodies advising the European Commission (EC) on
technological futures. Conceived by the EC in 2002 as a
way to stimulate increased R&D investments, European
Technology Platforms (ETPs) are forums where experts and
stakeholders formulate joint visions and recommendations
about research directions and priorities for specific technolo-
gies [9]. Thirty-six ETPs currently cover emerging technolo-
gies in energy, environment and IT, as well as in areas of
industrial production, food and medicine. ETP members—
primarily industry actors—finance most platform operations,
while the EC maintains an observatory role and in some cases
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provide administrative support. Although varied in size, mem-
bership composition and activities, all platforms have formu-
lated a common Vision Document for their respective tech-
nology and agreed on a Strategic Research Agenda (SRA),
deliverables that are intended to inform the design of the
European Framework Programmes for Research. The EC
requires these documents to provide a “coherent and unified
approach to tackle major economic, technological or societal
challenges [10].” While the EC is not obliged to follow
recommendations from ETPs, these units have in some cases
become the “go-to” forums when expert advice on emerging
technologies is needed for other areas of EU policymaking,
and also sought to establish themselves as authoritative expert
institutions in the public sphere. Such forms of less formalized
activity, coupled with ETPs’ status as expert forums charged
with integrating strategic technical advice and prediction with
perceived “economic, technological or societal challenges”
warrants critical attention. To that end, this article investigates
the activities of one ETP, exploring how it anticipates and
addresses public concerns about its technological area and
which pathways of political and societal development are
implicated in the production of its technological visions.
Some FS scholars have pointed to the limitations on pre-
dictive expertise when it comes to the societal implications of
developments in science and technology [11, 12], indicating
that issues of stakeholder participation and representational
legitimacy are particularly important in cases where prediction
deals with contentious technologies—a core research area in
STS. The following article therefore focuses on the activities
of an ETP formed around a technology that has at times been
the subject of heated public debate and protests. Carbon
dioxide capture and storage (CCS), for which the Zero
Emissions Platform (ZEP) ETP was established in 2005, is a
suite of technologies designed to limit greenhouse gas emis-
sions by capturing CO2 from large stationary emission
sources and transporting it for permanent storage in geological
formations deep underground. Its primary area of application
is power plants running on fossil fuels, but it can also find uses
in industrial production. CCS draws on technological process-
es that are generally described as proven, but not yet commer-
cially viable, and tends to be included amongst the technolo-
gies that are needed to mitigate climate change [13, 14].
However, it has also been the source of public fears and
controversies about the safety of CO2 storage [15], and divid-
ed environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs)
on questions such as whether public investments in CCS
divert funding from renewable energy technologies [16].
The article proceeds by outlining relevant literature and
methods, before presenting ZEP’s visions and recommenda-
tions for CCS. It goes on to discuss how ZEP might be
considered an authority on CCS, as well as its approach to
publics and their concerns. The institutional design of ETPs
and the political priorities that ZEP’s visions and activities
have become entangled with are also discussed. The article
concludes that predictions about technological development
allows potentially contentious societal choices to be masked
as technological ones, and that increased attention to the
sociotechnical dynamics of technology-driven visions, draw-
ing on insights from FS and STS, could add necessary trans-
parency and legitimacy to the activities of expert forums,
consistent with current EC guidelines.
Literature and methods
This article draws on a strand of literature that investigates the
political dynamics of technology by examining the patterns of
power and authority it facilitates, and by being attentive to the
range of social practices and governance structures that
emerge around it [17, 18]. Rather than demarcating science
and technology as separate from societal structures, the article
attempts to understand how ZEP’s visions and strategies for
CCS assume particular paths of co-production [19], where
technological development and social life develop dialectical-
ly. In this spirit ZEP’s descriptions and depictions of CCS are
treated here as expressions of sociotechnical imaginaries
[20], founded not only on technical predictions but also on
assumptions about social change and stability. This approach
responds to recent calls in FS scholarship for heightened
awareness of the political pathways and institutional factors
that enable or constrain the efforts to realize futures that are
envisioned as desirable [21], supplementing it by also address-
ing the constellations of power that such visions assume. The
article is explorative, and adopts an STS-approach to “opening
up” assumptions and implicit framings that underlie expert
predictions and recommendations about the future [22].
Without seeking exhaustive answers, it aims to investigate
the range of ways that ETPs help shape ideas about both the
polities and policies that technologies might serve.
ZEP’s activities are explored using a combination of qual-
itative case study methods [23]. Policy documents outlining
the rationale behind ETPs, as well as ZEP’s Vision Document
and Strategic Research Agenda for CCS, are investigated by
asking theory-driven questions about the range of political
priorities the platform has become associated with. In order
to examine the platform’s less regulated activities outside of
its formalized inputs to the EC, ZEP publications targeting the
general public are also examined. The aim is to understand the
design and rationale behind communication efforts in relation
to ZEP’s conceptions about European publics, rather than to
measure its impact. To illuminate strategic choices underlying
ZEP’s CCS scenarios, minutes from the meetings of ZEP’s
constituent working groups—publicly available from
zeroemissionsplatform.eu—are consulted. Eleven semi-
structured interviews with past and current ZEP personnel
and EC civil servants were carried out in Brussels, Paris and
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through teleconferencing, ranging between 30 and 60 min,
with the aim of exploring questions that were not generally
addressed in official publications. Interviewees were recruited
through direct contact with individuals involved in the
drafting of relevant official documents. Possible directions
and approaches for future research are given in the conclusion.
A vision and a strategy
Six months after its official launch in December 2005 ZEP
released its Vision Document for “Zero Emissions Fossil Fuel
Power Plants [24].” The EC requires all ETPs to formulate
such a document in order to unite platform members around a
shared set of ambitions that can guide their efforts to recom-
mend priorities and strategies for research and development in
the European Union (EU) [10]. ZEP's members at the time
included ENGOs and research units funded by member state
governments, though the majority of members were from
industry companies.1 Their vision portrayed CCS as a way
to reconcile ambitious European commitments to climate
change mitigation with increasing energy demands and the
need to maintain global competitiveness for European indus-
try. The need for CCS was demonstrated with reference to
warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) about the consequences of inaction on climate
change, and to predictions by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) that world energy demand would increase
massively between 2004 and 2030, with fossil fuels continu-
ing to dominate the global power generation market. ZEP laid
out a vision of zero emissions fossil fuels power plants by
2020 , to be achieved through EU and member state research
support which would stimulate industry confidence and will-
ingness to invest in CCS, and effective dissemination to
“improve public understanding that the technologies are safe
and reliable and that substantial benefits will be gained from
their deployment [10].”
The platform subsequently released an SRA describing the
technology development efforts that would realize ZEP's vi-
sion [25], as well as a Strategic Deployment Document
(SDD), outlining possible political and regulatory measures
to stimulate CCS [26]. These documents—later revised—
recommended the establishment of 10–12 large-scale CCS
demonstration projects across “the length and breadth of
Europe,” which would both test technological processes and
“demonstrate the safety of CO2 geological storage” in order to
influence public perceptions. Indeed, public support was iden-
tified as a crucial factor for the future of CCS, and several
research recommendations were explicitly presented as
aiming to provide evidence to sway public opinion and per-
suade publics of the desirability of CCS, rather than to address
technological knowledge gaps. Elaborate recommendations
were made for how research on public perceptions of CCS
could contribute to increasing levels of support for the tech-
nology. The 2020 timeline set down in ZEP’s vision document
was presented as an argument for immediate initiation of
political and regulatory measures to support CCS—steps
which ZEP claimed would increase industry willingness to
take financial risk and invest in the technology. Concrete
recommendations included incentivizing geological CO2 stor-
age under the newly launched EU Emissions Trading System
(ETS)—the world’s largest cap and trade system and a cor-
nerstone in the EU’s climate change mitigation strategy—and
the establishment a regulatory framework for CO2 storage
across EU member states.
ZEP’s vision was thus translated into a research strategy
whose realization depended on synergies with political incen-
tives, regulatory frameworks and public opinion. More than
simply a prediction about a state of technological development
and a plan for reaching it, ZEP’s vision for CCS can be seen as
a sociotechnical imaginary built on assumptions about the
organization of political and economic structures—for exam-
ple with regards to the timing and design of EU funding
mechanisms—as well as about the form and purpose of reg-
ulation. These assumptions continue to influence the plat-
form’s own attempts to establish public support, as well as
the EU’s political pursuit of CCS as a pathway to energy
security and environmental sustainability.
Envisioning publics
One starting point for understanding ZEP’s role as an expert
institution is its approach to public communication. From the
time of its founding ZEP maintained a designated Public
Communication Taskforce alongside its taskforces on
Demonstration & Implementation, Technology, and Policy
& Regulation, whose efforts are coordinated with the plat-
form’s leadership in ZEP’s Advisory Council. Early meetings
in the communication taskforce were characterized by uncer-
tainty about its assignment, as well as about who their target
audiences were and how they should be approached. At the
taskforce meeting on December 18 2006 initial formulations
of its objective included “educate, get rid of ignorance,”
“advocate and push for CCS implementation in Member
States” and “provide information but also sell CCS.” The
assumption within the taskforce appears to have been that its
1 At the time of writing, ZEP’s webpage presents organizational mem-
bership as divided into Government (2), NGOs (3), Companies (24), and
Academia &Research (7). A similar estimate is given inminutes from the
Advisory Council meeting of February 22, 2006, which states that out of
93 individuals representing ZEP’s organizational members, 60 % come
from industry, 30 % from the research community, and 10 % from NGOs
“and similar organizations.”
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role was to provide ways to frame CCS efficiently and posi-
tively, and discussion summaries indicate a conscious effort to
establish at least an appearance of dialogical engagement
with autonomous publics, recommending the use of the term
“‘inform’ rather than ‘educate’ (too arrogant).”
The taskforce does not do or initiate its own research on
public engagement with CCS, as the SRA might suggest. Nor
does it attempt to directly engage with publics, despite ZEP’s
emphasis on public attitudes to CCS as a critical concern.
Instead the platform maintains a public presence at events,
such as the annual Conference of the Parties to the UN’s
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and produces
communication materials on CCS that are distributed online
and to platform members and EU member state governments
for use in various educational efforts. Communication strate-
gies are formulated in response to the findings of a designated
Eurobarometer on awareness and acceptance of CCS [27],
commissioned by the EC, where surveys of public attitudes
in 12 EU member states found that CCS is relatively un-
known, that it is not as well favored as renewable energy
technologies, and that a number of misconceptions—such as
the belief that CO2 can explode—might lead publics to be
skeptical of the technology. ZEP’s publications address these
findings by seeking to build awareness and correct misunder-
standings about the technology, with advocates attempting to
further the technology by “[redefining] the social as barriers to
be overcome and approach[ing] it as what they must do to
make the technical successful [28].” Like with other ETPs
[29], ZEP's self-expressed concerns about the importance of
public attitudes to their technological area have become
coupled with public engagement efforts aimed at establishing
public acceptance, rather than on facilitating civic delibera-
tion. Indeed, interviews indicated that the marketing of the
organization itself was seen as a central objective of its com-
munication activities, and that the production of a clear brand
identity for ZEP, expressed through unified design elements
and a new logo, were seen as important achievements.
The pamphlet The hard facts behind CCS [30], illustrates
the geological processes by which CO2 becomes “trapped” in
storage reservoirs, explaining that technological development
is dependent on EU funding, legislation and accelerated per-
mitting processes. EU regulation requiring safe and permanent
storage of CO2 is referenced as a guarantee of predictability
and success. Another pamphlet, CO2 Capture and Storage
(CCS): Why It Is Essential to Combat Global Warming [31],
states that while replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy
is “the ultimate goal,” CCS offers the sustainable use of fossil
fuels, and is a necessary transitory step because renewable
energy is currently unable to “sustain even a basic standard of
living.” The continued reliance on fossil fuels is presented as
inevitable. Few attempts are made to distinguish between
normative and technical aspects of CCS, and the technology
is described as facilitating European energy demands to be
met while boosting European economy and industry compet-
itiveness. ZEP’s pamphlets are described as presenting the
joint recommendations of “European industry, environmen-
talists, scientists and geologists.”
As educational tools, these pamphlets give insight into how
ZEP envisions its publics and their concerns, as well as the
specific aspects of CCS that such publics are thought able to
form meaningful opinions about. The platform appears to
operate with a deficit model view of an uninformed polity that
will lend its support to CCS if only provided with enough
accurate technical information [32]. As one interviewee stated,
much time and energy was spent on ensuring that all facts and
figures in ZEP’s publications were as accurate as possible.
However, there seemed to have been less critical attention
given to the broader narratives of a European purpose for
CCS. Rather than approaching publics as having diverse inter-
ests and concerns about CCS that need to be addressed through
engagement, ZEP’s publics seem to be cast as unable to
formulate autonomous opinions about the relative desirability
of CCS compared with other climate change mitigation tech-
nologies and strategies, and as passive targets for information.
ZEP’s publications present a sociotechnical imaginary of
CCS as a pathway to protecting and maintaining current
European lifestyles and economic structures, while simulta-
neously strengthening unitary conceptions of “European
economy” and “European industry” as defined against the
outside world. Tensions and conflicting interests between
industries and member states within the EU are not addressed.
Sustaining industry and fossil fuel based power generation is
presented as integral to upholding current standards of living.
The inevitability of continued demand for fossil fuel based
power generation is not problematized, and CCS is instead
portrayed as a technology whose only risks and uncertainties
are technical in kind and thus controllable by experts.
These unitary visions obscure tensions between ZEP’s
constituent members. Archival and interview research indicate
how communication choices have been shaped by ZEP’s
institutional design and the EC’s expectations for how ETPs
should envision technological futures.
Consensus by design
While ZEP’s communication activities seem to address a
homogenous European public, its institutional design has
strong influence over how its members come to formulate
shared research recommendations. ZEP’s role as an expert
body consulting the EC implies epistemic authority, while
the inclusion of ENGOs in the platform implies at least some
degree of representational legitimacy. ZEP has the character-
istics of a boundary organization capable of displaying differ-
ent forms of authority depending on the context [33]. Neither
the ENGOs nor the private companies involved in the
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platform hold unified positions on CCS. ENGO members,
while generally supportive of CCS as a strategy for ecological
modernization [34], pursue the sharing of technical expertise,
intellectual property issues and regulatory questions in ways
that at times conflict with the aims of the platform’s commer-
cial members. Industry, in turn, are clustered into three fac-
tions—equipment suppliers, utilities, and oil and gas—each
with their own sets of interests in the future of CCS. ZEP’s
constituents cover a broad range of positions on what aspects
of CCS should be incentivized and on which CCS-related
research should be supported by the EU, establishing the
ETP as a forum for strategic negotiation about the distribution
of research funds and policy priorities. The platform’s
privileged position as research advisor depends on presenting
joint recommendations to the EC, forcing platform members
to negotiate and arrive at unified proposals for the future of the
technology. In this, the ETP serves as an obligatory passage
point that requires actors with an interest in CCS to participate
and cooperate on shared recommendations in order to main-
tain the status as the official representative of CCS stake-
holders vis-à-vis the EC [35]. Interviews indicated that this
institutional design fostered negotiations within factions as
well, as one ZEP representative stated:
Each [constituency] has a designated person that rep-
resents that group. And their role is to communicate on
behalf of their constituency. So where there are issues of
disagreement, there they are able to articulate that. But
equally their role is to gain consensus within their
constituency on various affairs. So if someone came
back from the utilities and said “hey, we’ve got five
utilities for, we’ve got ten against, and five in the mid-
dle,” it doesn’t help anything. The point is, what can you
agree on and then move forward as a platform.
In the time leading up to ZEP’s establishment, the EC drew
on this institutional characteristic in order to secure “neutral-
ity” in ZEP’s expert recommendations, and “credibility” in its
public communication efforts. Civil servants explained in
interviews that the EC had presented the participation of
NGOs as a criterion for officially recognizing the platform.
While this had not been required of previous ETPs, it was
thought that NGOs would add necessary credibility to a
platform consisting primarily of members from fossil fuels
industries.
So we thought that it was a good position to get a kind of
a neutral view [and that NGOs were likely to] push
forward things like more research on monitoring or
tighter regulation on monitoring and that sort of thing.
Minutes from the September 4 2007 communication
taskforce meeting illustrate how ZEP foregrounds ENGO
members in order to inspire public trust and add weight to
the argument of the urgency of CCS.
ETP ZEP is not a credible body to communicate the
message an NGO is more credible. In addition […], the
current key message—CCS as a key solution for combat-
ing climate change—is too complicated (less complicated
message: ‘enabling zero emission power plants’). As
urgency of climate change and large scale deployment
of CCS are important topics/ problems, involvement of
the public at large is crucial. A simple message to inform
and convey the public that CCS is necessary is therefore
crucial (they don’t need further explanation) .
While intended by the EC as a “check” on the possible
interest bias of industry members, the ENGOs involved in
ZEP thus appear to also have provided strategic leverage to
the platform’s public communication efforts. ZEP’s informa-
tion pamphlets frequently refer to the platform’s recommen-
dations as the joint advice of European industry and environ-
mental groups, projecting the image of an inclusive stakehold-
er forum operating around a shared technological vision.
However, the institutional design of ETPs has established
boundaries as well. While CCS-skeptical Greenpeace partic-
ipated in the preparatory stages of ZEP’s formation, it was
reported at the communication taskforce meeting of
December 18, 2006 that the organization had withdrawn from
the platform “since it feels that the Commission is pushing too
hard for CCSwithout listening to [ENGOs].” TheWorldWide
Fund for Nature, WWF, followed suit shortly after. In 2008
Greenpeace International released a report explaining its op-
position to CCS, citing not only the types of health and safety
risks of CCS generally addressed in ZEP’s current information
material, but also skepticism towards broader societal impli-
cations of the technology [36]. Such implications include the
potential of CCS to sustain the global dependence on fossil
fuels, disincentivize renewable energy development, and dis-
suade political measures to change energy intensive consump-
tion patterns. As Corry and Riesch have aptly shown, ENGOs
who oppose CCS are not simply driven by a fear of technical
risks and hazards, but also by more complex lines of opposi-
tion to the socio-economic arrangements that the technology
is thought to facilitate or sustain [37]. In Dryzek’s terms, the
rationale of CCS-skeptical ENGOs reflect survivalist and
green radicalism thinking, schools of environmentalist
thought that run counter to those seeking convergences be-
tween environmental protection and economic growth [34].
While ZEPs communication of CCS focuses on performance
aspects and risks that are manageable by experts through
technology and regulation, the societal structural grounds for
skepticism toward CCS expressed by Greenpeace and other
CCS critics, are largely ignored. The broader implication
appears to be that in the case of technologies associated with
environmental policy, the ETP format carries a bias against
ENGOs skeptical of constructing environmental governance
around market mechanisms and technology optimism.
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In withdrawing, Greenpeace relinquished their formalized
influence over EC research priorities offered by ETP partici-
pation. The requirement that ETP members reach and support
joint recommendations to guide the pursuit of technological
futures appears to underwrite two distinct processes of co-
production. It ensures the mutual constitution of technological
advice and societal organization in the present, and it stimu-
lates the production of scenarios where technologies serve
desired economic and political structures in sociotechnical
imaginaries for the future. In the process, definitions of who
constitutes stakeholders of technological change are stream-
lined, and dissent effectively managed through self-exclusion.
Envisioning a political technology
ZEP’s vision for CCS was not simply of the realization of an
isolated technology, but also one of political possibility, where
achieving “zero emission power plants by 2020” would joint-
ly address issues across policy sectors. CCS represented the
potential for a unique technical fix to a particular constellation
of political problems potentially reconciling EU energy needs
with ambitious commitments to climate change mitigation.
This point was foregrounded in ZEP’s presentations of its
research recommendations, helping to establish the platform
as offering input to a broader range of political processes than
what had previously been customary for ETPs. One EC rep-
resentative explained that while many ETPs only interacted
with EC coordinators in the department, or Directorates-
General (DG’s, comparable with national ministries) for
Research and Innovation, the multi-sectorial relevance of
ZEP and CCS had led policy officials from numerous DGs
to become attentive to the platform’s activities and recommen-
dations. Minutes from the policy and regulation taskforce
meeting of April 19, 2007 show that the platform delivered
joint platform positions to a range of EC bodies on issues such
as the inclusion of CCS in the EU ETS carbon market to the
Environment DG, and that it gave input on financial incen-
tives to the DG for Transport and Energy and on state aid to
the DG for Competition.
Interviewees in the EC gave diverging answers when asked
directly if they thought ZEP influenced other areas of EU
policy besides research. While some civil servants insisted
that ZEP was purely a research advisor, others stated that in
practice the platform opened lines of communication through
which CCS stakeholders could give input to different areas of
EU policymaking. Interviewees were clear, however, that rep-
resentatives from the full range of EC departments working on
issues of relevance to CCS would regularly attend ZEP meet-
ings to give updates on current and future developments in their
policy areas. While this paper cannot speak to the actual extent
to which ZEP might have influenced the design of EU policy
strategies, the platform’s archives give some indication that
ZEP’s formal tasks as research advisor allowed it to also operate
as a hub through which informal communication between a
broad range of European CCS stakeholders and EC officials
could take place. As one interviewee put it, the platform has in
effect become “a reference point for Europe.”
While ZEP’s vision of emissions free power plants were
epistemically justified in relation to expert assessments by the
IPCC and the IEA about the prospects and potential conse-
quences of increasing atmospheric CO2 content, themechanisms
that the platform proposed as ways to realize this sociotechnical
imaginary, cannot be divorced from choices about mechanisms
of governance. They included recommendations about the de-
sign of fiscal incentives, the establishment of regulatory frame-
works, the clarification of liability issues and division of respon-
sibilities between industry and national governments, the devel-
opment of risk management strategies, and, as discussed above,
the importance of gaining public support [26].
Some of these mechanisms have become political realities
during the course of ZEP’s existence. Political support for
CCS in EU federal level policy has been on the rise since
around 2005, paralleling increased political attention to the
technology in several of its member states, and developed
alongside a number of EU efforts to meet climate change
mitigation commitments [38]. In line with recommendations
made in ZEP’s SRA, regulatory standards in the form of a
CCS directive, the inclusion of CCS in the EU’s ETS carbon
market, and the formalized goal of up to 12 large-scale CCS
demonstration plants across the EU have all been formulated
and pursued by the EC and the EUCouncil ofMinisters in this
period. Nilsson and colleagues have argued that there is a
tendency for strategic planning units in public policy to ignore
political and institutional pathways and barriers to desirable
futures [21]. ZEP actually appears to be highly aware of the
importance of such pathways in their research recommenda-
tions. But when it comes to public communication materials
explaining the form and purpose of CCS, the institutional and
socio-political implications of the technology—the broader
economic and environmental governance contexts that would
lend meaning to CCS—are rarely discussed. This contrast is
striking in light of the EC’s stated ambitions regarding expert
advice, to which we now turn.
Summary discussion
The ETP format has taken shape alongside attempts by the EC
to institutionalize mechanisms for civic representation in ex-
pert forums. Partly in response to criticisms about EU tech-
nocratic governance [39], the EC has sought to clarify its
routines for the collection and use of expertise over the early
2000s [40, 41]. In line with the rationales given in the FS
literature for inclusive approaches to technology assessment
[12], new guidelines for the use of expert advice in strategic
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planning and foresight have called for variously defined “in-
terested parties” to be consulted, with the explicit aim of
adding legitimacy to issue definitions and problem framings
[42]. These ambitions were applied to ETPs from their very
inception, when the EC recognized that since “technology
platforms address major economic and societal challenges, the
societal dimension should be taken into account throughout
their development [10].” However, ETPs have not simply been
charged with predicting the future of new technologies, but also
with proposing strategic measures by which technological de-
velopment can be put to the service of European integration—
both by facilitating EU stability and growth, and by catering to
and helping to create an envisioned European public. Platforms
were instructed to establish “an ongoing communication pro-
cess, with a view to raising public awareness and enhancing
dialogue on the justification for concentration of efforts at a
European level in the technological field concerned [10].”
With ZEP, these ambitions appear to have translated into an
approach to public communication where ENGOs are
foregrounded both as guarantors of the “neutrality” of techni-
cal advice, and as ensuring that “societal dimensions” are
appropriately addressed. But ENGO inclusion does not nec-
essarily contribute to broader aims of representational legiti-
macy or to the deeper rationales of the technology assessment
approaches that appear to have inspired the EC’s changing
ambitions for the use of expertise. As we have seen, the
requirement that ZEP must present unitary positions forces
members to negotiate both between and within constituent
factions in order to formulate joint recommendations. For
certain ENGOs, the risk of becoming associated with posi-
tions that they fundamentally oppose outweighs the benefits
of the opportunity to influence the platform from within. Both
the notion that “neutrality” could be ensured by ENGO par-
ticipation, and the repeated claims that platform views repre-
sent the joint position of European industry, government and
ENGOs, ignore the fact that ENGOs skeptical or opposed to
CCS saw no choice but to withdraw from the platform. CCS
opposition and skepticism has been based in part on a rejection
of the notion that an increased demand for energy generation
from fossil fuels is inevitable—a basic premise for ZEP’s
sociotechnical imaginary of CCS as the necessary technological
fix for interlinked policy problems in the areas of energy and
climate change mitigation. It seems possible that precisely the
absence of members critical about the broader sociotechnical
implications of CCS has contributed to shaping ZEP’s commu-
nication efforts, which assume a deficit model of publics where
audiences are seen as passive benefactors of CCS, expected to
support the technology when presented with expert assurances
about technical safety.
ZEP consistently presents CCS as a way to reconcile the
EU’s ambitions for climate change mitigation with an
expected rise in energy demand. As Claes and Frisvold have
shown, CCS could completely alter the position of coal,
turning it into “the most abundant, reliable and inexpensive
energy source in Europe [43].” ZEP’s vision of zero emissions
fossil fuel power plants implies that coal can be both legiti-
mate from an environmental perspective, and profitable within
the context of the European carbon market. In this respect,
ZEP’s vision reformulates political problems and priorities by
deferring to the prospects of interrelated change in technolog-
ical systems and mechanisms of governance. Thus, the plat-
form’s scenarios justifying the pursuit of CCS can be seen not
simply as discursive moves to reframe narratives on fossil
fuels, or as transparent and accountable policy advice, but also
as sociotechnical imaginaries implying promises about mate-
rial, social and political organization [20]. ZEPs imaginary of
a European CCS-future implicates a diverse range of infra-
structural and market networks connecting fossil fuel extrac-
tion with political and societal organization, ultimately shap-
ing what Michell refers to as “the forms of democratic politics
that carbon energy [makes] possible [44].”
When understanding the role of ETPs in shaping political
concerns, it might be useful to not simply look at how these
forums present emerging technologies as ways to achieve
sectorial goals, but also to consider their function as a new
form of European space. ETPs were originally conceived as a
way of contributing to the institutionalization of the European
Research Area—an ongoing effort since 2000—and assump-
tions about European unitary interests underlie much of their
output and the duties formulated for them by the EC. In
his foreword to ZEP's 2006 vision document, the then
Commissioner for Science and Research Janez Potocnik stat-
ed that zero emission power generation could both stimulate
and benefit from processes of European integration [24]. As
described in this article, ZEP’s publications tend to present
European industry, economy, publics and political concerns as
units defined against the outside world, free from internal
tensions or inconsistencies. The institutional design of ETPs
demands that platform members negotiate and arrive at joint
positions that in turn can be presented as the common recom-
mendations of public and private European stakeholders.
These boundary organizations thus serve purposes beyond
their technological areas, as the production of technological
visions becomes entangled with the joint production of
European publics and political strategies.
Conclusion
This article has drawn on FS and STS literature in order to
explore how a new institutional unit for technological fore-
sight and advice to the EC has (1) formulated particular ideas
about public concerns and how to address them, and (2)
produced a vision for a CCS-future with implications not only
for the technology itself, but also for the organization of a
wide range of social and political structures around it. In
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contrast with understandings of technology as defined by its
technical functions—“The only reason to build a CCS plant is to
avoid atmospheric emissions of CO2 [45]”—the construction of
ZEP’s recommendations implicates a diverse network of
European actors, whose stakes in the technology are defined
in relation to sociotechnical arrangements, rather than against
isolated technical properties. This case thus illustrates how units
of foresight can be seen as producing sociotechnical imaginaries
with important co-productionist implications, which in ZEP’s
case consisted of authoritative and “policy-ready” expert advice
produced alongside formulations of pan-European economic
and political interests, and constructions of knowledge-
deficient publics ready to be persuaded by experts. While the
role of ENGOs have helped illustrate this in the case of CCS and
ZEP, it is not unlikely that similar dynamics are at play in other
ETPs dealing with technologies which, even if less overtly
controversial, nevertheless implicate choices about governance
mechanisms and societal arrangements. Processes of issue fram-
ing and stakeholder representation in ETPs therefore deserve
further study.
Alongside the implications of ZEP’s strategic reasoning for
the future, the establishment and operation of this technology
platform also attributes legitimacy to certain CCS stake-
holders as EC-sanctioned experts in the present, excluding
others in the process. As one might expect, ZEP has sought to
influence domains beyond its narrowly defined obligations to
the EC, and the platform has established informal lines of
communication both within the EC complex and in the public
domain to those ends. While it has been beyond the scope of
this article to measure the relative success of these efforts, it
has sought to identify them as areas in which more work is
needed, if the EC’s stated aims for transparency and represen-
tational legitimacy in the use of expert advice are to be
achieved. The inclusion of NGO representatives is not neces-
sarily sufficient, and additional aims, strategies and methodo-
logical approaches to technology assessment might be needed
in order to pursue these ambitions within the ETP framework.
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